1A
SESSION: History of BIG, Part I
Fred Bock,
“Basic Income and the Shadow of Speedhamland.”
The analysis of the "Speenhamland" era of the English Poor Law has
had a surprisingly important influence on recent social policy debates in the
United States. This paper reviews that influence and analyzes a large body of
scholarship on the English Poor Law between 1795 and 1834 produced by economic
and social historians over the past four decades. While sifting through this
evidence is complex, the basic conclusion is that recent scholarship has
undermined the Speenhamland stories told by social policy analysts from a
variety of theoretical perspectives. The paper concludes with an account of how
the initial Speenhamland story played a critical role in the development of the
tradition of Classical Economics.
John Cunliffe,
University of Central England, and Guido
Erreygers, University of Antwerp, “Inheritance and Equal Shares: Early American
Views”
The
idea that each young adult is entitled to an equal capital endowment funded
mainly from inheritance taxation constitutes the core of the recent
'stakeholding' proposal advocated by Ackerman & Alstott. In our paper, we
trace some intellectual antecedents of this liberal-egalitarian position. The
idea of equal initial endowments is neither novel nor original. Specifically,
we examine three cases drawn from American writers in the first half of the
nineteenth century. The first and least developed case was presented by
Cornelius Blatchly in 1817; the second, and more comprehensive case was
presented by Thomas Skidmore in 1829; and the third intriguing case was
presented by Orestes Brownson in 1840. Each of these writers argued that equal
opportunities required equal starts. In their view, the existing inheritance
regimes perpetuated and accentuated a strongly unequal division of individual
wealth, which therefore violated equal starts and jeopardised equal
opportunities. Accordingly, they called for a drastic reform or even abolition
of private inheritance, suggesting alternative mechanisms to disperse the value
of the property of the deceased so as to secure equal starts and thus to
promote genuine equal opportunity. Although there is no easily identifiable
transmission of intellectual influence between the three writers, we draw
attention to a common and possibly shared background provided by the views of
Jefferson and Paine on intergenerational issues.
Walter Van
Trier, Catholic University of Leuven, “Who Framed ‘Social Dividend’?”
This papers spans the period
from 1917 to 1986 – a period in which ‘social dividend’ was commonly used to
refer to policy-proposals implying an unconditional payment as of right to all
and everyone. This episode closed in 1986 with the First International
Conference on Basic Income consolidating the use of ‘basic income’. It opened
nearly 70 years earlier when G.D.H. Cole - Oxford professor, former Guild
socialist and later intellectual leader of the Fabian Society – constructed the
name ‘social dividend’ to refer to the Scheme for a State Bonus, put forward in
1917 by the Quaker Dennis Milner and his wife. Following the traces of ‘social
dividend’ through this episode from 1917 to 1986, one will encounter economic heretics
(like Major C.H. Douglas or J.A. Hobson), members of the Cambridge Circus (like
Joan Robinson or James Meade) or important participants in the debate on the
economics of planning (like Abba Lerner).
1B: THE ETHICS OF BIG, PART I
Karl Widerquist, the Educational Priorities Panel, “Who Exploits
Who?”
Gijs Van Donselaar uses a
novel definition of exploitation (A exploits B if A is better off and B worse
off than either of them would have been had the other not existed) and a series
of two-person examples to demonstrate that an unconditional basic income can be
exploitative and to make the case that everyone has both a right and
responsibility to work. This paper considers Van Donselaar’s version of
exploitation, his related concept of the abuse of rights, and the argument
against basic income derived from them to show that he has not demonstrated any
necessary relationship between these concepts and a social obligation to work:
People can receive an unconditional income without exploiting others; a social
obligation to work can punish people who are not exploiting others leading to
Pareto-inferior outcomes; and a social obligation to work can in fact cause the
kind of exploitation he believes it will cure.
Almaz Zelleke,
Independent Scholar, "Basic Income in the United States: Redefining
Citizenship in the Liberal State"
The debate over welfare
provision in the U.S. is currently dominated by those who argue that work is
central to citizenship, and thus that welfare should be conditional on
willingness to work. This understanding
of the importance of work to citizenship is shared both by these mainly
conservative American theorists, who argue for _selective_ work requirements
(for recipients of welfare only), and by some European socialist critics of an
unconditional basic income who argue for _universal_work requirments. American advocates of basic income must
articulate an alternative conception of citizenship that is more consistent
with the liberal, capitalist American tradition if basic income is to earn a
place on the policy agenda. This paper
suggests the outlines of such an alternative understanding of citizenship.
Al Sheahen, GAIN Publications, “Does
Everyone Have a Right to a Basic Income Guarantee?”
Simply because one exists, one
is entitled to certain inalienable human rights – life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. To secure these
rights, everyone should be guaranteed a minimum income by the Federal
Government -- enough for food, shelter, and basic necessities.
1C: BIG FUNDING OPTIONS
Jeffery J Smith, Geonomy Society, “BI- Brought to you by the people in
the environmental movement”
In recent years, cutting-edge
environmentalists have with ever
greater frequency called for sharing rent, as does Alaska with oil
revenue, and sharing the rental value of using the environment as a dump site.
Proposals such as the Sky Dividend by Peter Barnes (founder of Working Assets)
draws more attention and support than the usual income redistribution schemes
of most BIGists. And since most great fortunes are founded on the veneralbe
recipe of "privatize social values and socialize private costs", as
the environmentalists go about shifting taxes and subsidies, paying dividends
instead of funding corporate welfare, they will reverse the concentration of wealth,
leaving smaller, individual pools for wannabe BIGists to tax and redistribute.
Collecting and sharing rents - which is not redistribution but predistribution
(sharing rent before an elite or state has a chance to misspend it) - has more
fundamental advantages over sharing incomes(no matter how gotten). By shifting
taxes and other charges off production, onto pollution, extraction, and
speculative withholding, greens grow the economy in sustainable ways,
generating even more rent for sharing via a Citizens Dividend. And because it's
natural values that are to be shared, not one's income, this CD skirts the
psychological obstacles that hold back BIG. Alaskans would never relinquish
their oil dividend, while other peoples may yet copy this model, once urged by
Paine and Jefferson and other sons of liberty, making cross-spectrum outreach
possible.
Stephen Clark, “Funding a Basic Income Guarantee
Considering Size, Political Viability, and Pipeline.”
Before addressing the issue of
how to fund a BIG, one must consider the requirements and dimensions of such a
fund. The numbers are large, and the pipelines are enormous for anything that
becomes universal. George McGovern's unwillingness to address the mathematical
equation of $1,000 times every man, woman and child in the country dropped the
issue off the chart for over a generation. But let's look at it now, and
accustom ourselves to the size of the numbers so that when we talk about them,
we won't be shocked, and our discussion will be informed. I must admit ahead of
time that I will probably present things in a manner that will make my
suggestions seem the only obvious solution, but I will work against this.
Myron Frankman, McGill University,
“Funding a Planet-Wide Citizen's Income: Trial Calculations”
The case for the early
implementation of a global income guarantee (GIG) rather than programs that
reinforce the privileged position of those living in the rich countries and
(likely) widen the gaps between rich and poor countries is briefly stated. Also
briefly stated is my view that can be summarized as "Global Democracy or
No Democracy". I then go on to provide trial calculations showing the
feasibility of a GIG at levels of taxation which may be moderate enough to
convince those wishing to protect some measure of privilege that a GIG would be
cheaper than the escalating costs of personal and collective security
arrangements.
2A: HISTORY OF BIG, PART II
Richard K. Caputo, Yeshiva University, “FAP Flops: Lessons
Learned from the Failure to Pass the Family Assistance Plan in 1970 and 1972?”
A basic income program, known
as the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) nearly became national policy twice during
the Nixon Administration, guided primarily by the efforts of then domestic
policy advisor Daniel Patrick Moynihan. FAP died two deaths, the first in 1970
when the Senate Finance Committee voted 10 to 6 against it and again in 1972
when Congress passed the “Social Security Amendments of 1972,” legislation
aimed at reforming welfare, minus the FAP-related provisions, in part by
creating Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
Drawing on both primary and
secondary source material, this paper will explore several themes identified in
the Call for Papers in an attempt to draw lessons from the failed attempts to
pass FAP in 1970 and 1972. It will examine the politics involved, particularly
in regard to opposition from the more liberal constituencies like the
profession of social work and the National Welfare Rights Organization, as well
as the more conservative constituencies like the Southern Democrats.
The paper will also explore
the technical issues involved and show how the Nixon Administration grappled
with portended labor market effects in light of equity-efficiency tradeoffs,
exemplified in its attempts to devise a benefit formula that would not
discourage work yet prevent destitution. In doing so, the paper will place FAP
in historical context, describing the climate of opinion at a time of much
social change in the US, the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, and contrast
that with the contemporary climate of opinion in light of the ascendancy of
market-based principles in domestic policy.
The paper will view FAP as a
serious but flawed attempt to change welfare at the time and as a logical
precursor to passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in
1996 that in effect ended federal responsibility for many families with
dependent children. Lessons will be drawn to guide contemporary efforts to
obtain public support to place the notion of a basic income on the
Congressional Agenda and to secure its passage through Congress and
Presidential approval.
Al Sheahan, GAIN
Publications, “Why not Guarantee Everyone a Job? Why the Negative Income Tax
Experiments of the 1970s were Successful”
“Work”
has been virtually everyone’s solution to poverty for hundreds of years. But it’s not the answer. This is the hardest concept to sell to
citizens and policy makers. In 1969,
the President’s Commission on Income Maintenance Programs spent a lot of time
and research on this issue. They
concluded that guaranteeing an income is better, cheaper, and more desirable
than guaranteeing everyone a job. They
made a convincing case.
2B: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BIG, PART I
Nicoli Nattrass, University of Cape Town, and Jeremy Seekings, University of Cape Town, “The Political-Economy of
a Basic Income Grant in South Africa”
During the apartheid era,
labour market and welfare policies were racially biased and premised on the
existence of full-employment (at least for whites). Starting in the mid-1970s, the system gradually deracialised,
culminating in the transition to democracy in 1994. This process extended labour-market protection and a greater
degree of income security to many African people. However, as this coincided with high and rising levels of
unemployment, new holes in the welfare system emerged. Means-tested child-support and old-age
pensions provide support to the indigent young and elderly. But there is almost no support for those who
are of working age, but cannot find employment. For this reason, there are growing calls to extend the welfare
net to cover such individuals. One
proposal is for a ‘basic income grant’.
But while there is widespread support for such a grant, there is little
agreement yet as to how the additional tax burden is to be distributed. The paper will review the current debate,
placing it in an historic and socio-economic context.
Charles M. A. Clark, St. John's University, “Basic
Income: Promoting Social Justice in a 21st Century Economy”
Social Justice requires both
equity and efficiency. In the 20th
century this was promoted via the Welfare State. The dynamics of the "new economy" make this an
increasingly difficult task. Basic
Income, it is demonstrated, is a way to promote both equity and efficiency in
the context of a globalized economy.
Steve Shafarman, of the Citizen
Policies Institute, “Beyond Left vs. Right: A New Political Discourse”
With most issues or problems,
left liberal policies rely on government programs; from the right,
conservatives are typically anti-government, insisting that markets and private
enterprises are more reliable and efficient. With Citizen Dividends, we can
guarantee everyone's economic security while minimizing government's
involvement with markets, private enterprises, and the lives of ordinary
citizens. And there's a second way Citizen Dividends can transform political
discourse: Liberals and conservatives currently want government to provide or
create jobs; that will no longer be necessary when everyone has enough income
for food and shelter.
2C: EMPIRICAL ISSUES OF POVERTY, INEQUALITY,
AND EFFICIENCY
Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, and Wendy Naidich, all of the
Columbia University School of Social Work, “Effects Of Tax Rebates on Poverty and Income Distribution”
Despite years of public
concern, debate, and even outrage, little has been done to improve the
conditions of the poor in this country.
The fact is that programs aimed directly at poor people via
income-testing have done little to alleviate poverty. These programs are stigmatizing to use and create a disincentive
for work. Non-income tested programs,
on the other hand, such as social security, have been highly effective in
lifting people out of poverty as well as in serving non-poor people. In this paper, we consider one
non-income-tested method that has the potential to reach large numbers of poor
people-- the tax rebate. Tax rebates
are a method of guaranteeing a minimum income by providing broad-based cash
transfers in which transfer payments are made to individuals and families
without regard to income or wealth. A
fixed amount of cash is paid out by the government to each family in the
country. The amount of the payment
depends only on demographic criteria, such as age.
Through
a series of microsimulations, we tested the effectiveness of different tax
rebates, which focus on different demographic groups such as adult, children,
or single parents, in removing people from poverty, in reducing the poverty
gap, and in redistributing income among the population. The results suggest that tax rebates
decrease poverty more effectively than the current system. This highlights the fact that some of the
benefits in the current system, such as tax expenditures favor the rich instead
of the poor or the middle class. All
the tax rebate plans redistribute income from the highest quintiles to the
lower ones. Tax rebates not only more
equitably distribute income among the quintiles, but the distribution of
benefits is more equitable within the quintiles, particularly for people in the
first quintile.
The different tax rebate plans
have different effects on poverty and income distribution. Among them, the Adult Plus Plan is the most
redistributive of the plans. It
decreases the poverty rate of persons most significantly, and favors the first
three quintiles, instead of only the first quintile. The Adult Plus Plan, however, is not self-financing. The states must contribute the equivalent of
a proportional tax on income of 0.0548 to finance the plan. Thus, losers’ mean decreases in the Adult
Plus Plan are the highest among the plans.
In contrast the Children Plus and the Single-Parent Plus Plans are
self-financing and more focused on children and the first quintile. The disadvantage of the Children Plus Plan
is that it may be too pronatalist. In
our judgment, it is not. Similarly, the Single Parent Plus Plan, by rewarding
single parenthood, may encourage its growth.
If the Single Parent Plus Plan is achieved via a child support assurance
system, however, it will do more good at less cost and will have smaller effects on single parenthood than simply
increasing benefits for all single parents.
These refinements, however, should not obscure the basic lesson. Tax rebates are a good fundamental building
block for the modern welfare state.
Ed
Wolff, “Recent Trends in Living
Standards in the United States”
The media
are aglow with reports of the booming economy and rising prosperity in the
United States since the early 1990s. Indeed, the run-up in stock prices between
1995 and the end of 1999 has created the impression that all families are doing
well in terms of income and wealth. This, however, is certainly not the case.
As I shall demonstrate, most American families have seen their level of
well-being stagnate over the last quarter century.
Steven
Pressman, Monmouth University, “Guaranteed Incomes and the
Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff”
Any guaranteed income plan is
open to the objection that the program itself will hurt economic incentives and
therefore economic efficiency. Arthur
Okun probably expressed this tension best in the title of his well-known book Equality
and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.
One attempt to test and measure this tradeoff, the income maintenance
experiments of the 1980s, found that guaranteed incomes provided significantly
work disincentives, especially for married women, and discouraged
marriage. These social experiments are
generally regarded as the death knell for the negative income tax and other guaranteed
income programs in the US. This paper
will take another look at the big tradeoff between equality and
efficiency. It will do this by
employing an international perspective.
First, using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), the redistributive efforts
of 11 nations will be examined. The LIS
is a microdata set containing income data for a large number of countries over
a 20-year time period. National
redistributive efforts will be measured by comparing the factor incomes (before
any fiscal efforts) and the disposal incomes (after the impact of government
spending and taxes) of low-income households.
It will be argued that the difference between these two notions of
income is a good measure of the extent to which different nations guarantee
incomes at any point in time. Countries
will be ranked based upon their redistributive efforts. Next, the paper will look at several
measures of efficiency (productivity growth, unemployment rates and inflation
rates) for these countries and examine whether there is any correlation between
these measures and national redistributive efforts that maintain the incomes of
those in the bottom part of the distribution.
It will also examine whether, within a particular country, there are
differences in redistributive effort over time and whether these changes are
correlated with any change in efficiency.
As expected, the US makes the smallest redistributive efforts, followed
by Canada; the Scandinavian countries, again as expected, make the greatest
redistributive efforts. Preliminary
data, and the analysis of this data, indicate no relationship between national
redistributive efforts and the three main measures of efficiency. In addition, within individual countries,
there appears to be little relationship between redistributive effort and
macroeconomic efficiency. The paper
concludes that, within the parameters of current redistributive efforts taken
throughout the developed world, there is no big equity-efficiency tradeoff and
no efficiency argument against income guarantees. Whether such a tradeoff exists, and the magnitude of that
tradeoff, when redistributive efforts are greater than what is currently
employed, remains an open question.
3A: HISTORY OF BIG, PART III
Brian Steensland, Princeton University, “Defining
Welfare: Media Depictions of the Struggle over Guaranteed Income, 1966-1980.”
This media study examines
depictions of guaranteed income policies in the New York Times and other media
outlets between 1966 and 1980 (a period including debates over Nixon's Family
Assistance Plan and Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income). Patterns in
these media depictions demonstrate there was little consensus in the 1960s and
early 1970s over the goals of welfare reform and the proper means of attaining
them. Over the course of the 1970s, the heterogeneity of ways in which welfare
reform and guaranteed income policies were portrayed evolved into a more
homogenous depiction of welfare reform as having the dual goals of fiscal
management and the regulation of work behavior. These two goals disfavored
guaranteed income policy as a reform strategy. This decade-long evolution
occurred through the marginalization of particular social groups from national
debates, the passage of related legislation, and intellectual shifts among
policy makers regarding the role of the welfare state.
Bob Harris,
“The Guaranteed Income Movement of the 1960s and 1970s”
The 1960s saw great activity
in the development of American social policy. Long-standing programs were
modified and expanded, and much new legislation was passed. A civil rights
revolution took place, and providing equal access to the American Dream for all
was placed in a prominent place on the political agenda. In addition, a war on
poverty was declared and the goal of eradicating rather than ameliorating
poverty was established. Areas of sizable program expansion of particular
interest to the poor included cash transfer programs, education, housing, and
health financing programs. The purpose of this paper is to briefly review the
major proposals that were put forward during the decade of the 1960s, to relate
the nature of the debate over programs and strategies, and to assess its
legislative aftermath. To do so it is necessary to briefly trace the
development of the programs in need of reform, since the system was developed
over a long period, following a strategy laid out in the 1930s. Section II of
this paper provides such an outline. Section III outlines the criticisms of the
income security system of the '30s that developed during the debates, and the
split which developed among "liberals." The congressional struggle
over a specific reform plan is outlined in Section IV, leading up to the death
of President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan in 1972. An Appendix outlines many
of the reform ideas of the 1960s, and a number of comprehensive plans put
forward in this context.
Buford Farris,
St. Louis University, “Was it only a Dream: Guaranteed Income through the eyes
of a Sixties Poverty Warrior in Texas”
This
paper will present how the concept of a Guaranteed Income as a way to end
poverty became a major focus of organizing and projects for a community center
working with Mexican Americans in San Antonio, Texas. Early in the Sixties, the
center developed a comprehensive gang work project that was directed at the
total neighborhood. This project led the agency to become increasingly involved
in Welfare Rights in a state where the welfare system is one of the worst in
the nation. We then became involved with growing efforts throughout the country
to support a guaranteed income as public policy. At one point, we almost
received funding for a experimental project with different forms of guaranteed
income combined with different types of services directed at the Mexican
American population.. In this paper,
several areas are analyzed as to why these efforts failed. One reason may have been the lack of labor union
support for a guaranteed income. Also, Richard Rorty points again to another
factor involving the focus of many of the movements in the sixties as being on
"cultural politics" rather than "redistributive politics,"
When, I began teaching in the academic arena in the seventies there was very
little support for the War on Poverty and related issues even among sixties
activists who had been primarily involved in the Anti-War Movement.
3B: THE ETHICS OF BIG,
PART II
Amy Wax, University
of Pennsylvania Law School, “Something for Nothing: The Liberal Case Against
Welfare Work Requirements.”
In 1996, Congress repealed the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) federal poor relief program and
replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which includes
new strict time limits and mandatory work requirements for all able-bodied
recipients. As I have argued in previous work, TANF embodies a paradigm of
“conditional reciprocity” under which the collective, through government,
undertakes to aid only those individuals who are willing to make a reasonable
contribution to their own economic support.
The idea central to welfare
reform -- that the “quid pro quo” for public assistance is the willingness to
perform some kind of gainful activity -- is virtually unquestioned in the
political arena, but has not received unequivocal support in the academy. This
article examines the currency of this popular idea within one type of academic
discourse: liberal political theory. Specifically, it investigates whether
liberal theory can shed light on the question of whether just societies should
require work as a condition of public assistance for the able-bodied, or
whether aid should be provided unconditionally through, for example, a basic
guaranteed income for all. The focus of the discussion is on the objections
commonly voiced against unconditional income guarantees -- that they “exploit”
workers, license “free riding,” unfairly favor idle freeloaders over
upstanding, industrious citizens, run contrary to sound notions of “desert,”
and violate basic principles of social reciprocity. Drawing on the work of John
Rawls, Philippe Van Parijs, Ronald Dworkin, Andrew Levine, and Liam Murphy, and
others, the article investigates whether the analytic frameworks established by
standard liberal theories of justice can help make sense of these standard
objections. Of particular interest is whether any definitive conclusions about
work requirements or unconditional public assistance can be derived from the
widely accepted starting points for conceptions of just societies, such as
equal dignity, individual moral autonomy, equal initial shares, luck
invariance, and rational self-interest.
The article concludes that,
although the work of different liberal theorists offers valuable perspectives
and insights into the normative question of whether societies should provide
minimal financial support to all, a definitive answer remains elusive. Any
notion that transferring earnings from workers to able-bodied non-workers is
“unfair,” “unjust,” or exploitative of others is difficult to derive from the
fundamental building blocks for liberal formulations of just societies. Rather,
arguments about the fairness or unfairness of placing conditions on the
redistribution of resources tend to smuggle in underived, foundational
assumptions that rest on their own intrinsic appeal. If these commitments are
indeed sui generis, they must either command our assent or fail.
The article concludes by
drawing on an evolutionary analysis, explored somewhat in previous work, of the
popular view that forgoing work requirements licenses unfair “free-riding.” The
previous work speculated on the psychological origins of the widespread
tendency to classify recipients of public aid as “deserving” and “undeserving”
and to express moralistic disapproval of collective generosity towards those
defined as “undeserving.” After reiterating the suggestion that these normative
attitudes may originate in the adaptive advantages enjoyed by cultures that
discourage free riding on collective resources, this paper examines the
implications of this conjecture for theories of justice and most especially for
the development of contractarian approaches that are so dominant in the liberal
arena. It concludes that the ambivalence of liberal theories towards the
“reactive attitudes” that underlie ordinary persons’ intuitions about justice
and fairness, reflected in the equivocal and ambiguous treatment of those
attitudes within the reigning theoretical frameworks, yields few determinate
conclusions about the specific question at issue: whether a just liberal society
should forbid, permit, or require work as a condition of public assistance.
Roy Morrison, independent scholar, “A Framework for Justice and
Fairness”
This paper will consider,
first, justice and fairness as an essential part of the work of democracy and
ecological transformation, and examine freedom and community as an accessible
point of entry. Second, it will present a framework for justice and fairness as
a detailed policy plan based on a balance of rights and responsibilities, that
is, a negative income tax and universal national service.
Michael W. Howard, The University of Maine, “Liberal
and Marxist Justifications for Basic Income”
In this paper I consider
several objections to the proposal for the proposal for a basic income (i.e., the
idea of an unconditional guaranteed income for all residents). First, some
argue that, contrary to the argument of Van Parijs, a basic income will violate
liberal neutrality; liberal neutrality requires means testing and/or
willingness to work as a condition for income guarantee. Second, others,
particularly Marxists, argue that a basic income undermines work as a condition
of human dignity and happiness, perpetuates alienation, mitigates the social
costs of capitalism without addressing the root causes of those costs,
perpetuates unemployment, and is exploitative of workers. I will consider the
extent to which these arguments can be met while accepting the moral principles
on which they are based.
3C: BIG AND THE ALTERNATIVES, PART I
James B. Bryan, Manhattanville College and the
Institute for SocioEconomic Studies, “Did the U.S. Welfare Reforms of 1996 and
the Expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit Eliminate the Need for a Basic
Income Guarantee?”
The 1996 welfare reforms and
the expanded Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S. have been pronounced
outstanding successes by Washington legislators. The jury of academic scholarship has not rendered a final verdict
but, to date, has given mixed reviews.
The popular view, which has anointed the reforms and the EITC
successful, makes the political case for the BIG in the United States much more
difficult. Before Sisyphus can resume
his task in the current climate, a clearer contrast between the effects of the
BIG and those of the current program regime must be articulated.
In the tradition of
microeconomic policy analysis, this paper will provide a detailed review of the
ways in which the 1996 reforms and the expansion of the EITC have changed:
Following this review of changed incentives and of the literature on their labor market effects, inferences will be drawn about the differences that would occur if a Basic Income Guarantee were substituted for the bulk of existing programs. Specific reference will be made to the National Tax Rebate proposal that has been put forward by the Institute for SocioEconomic Studies.
Steve Shafarman, Citizen Policies Institute, “Ending Hunger,
Homelessness, and Debilitating Poverty: Comparing BIG and other approaches”
Living
wage campaigns have been fairly successful in recent years, a period of
relative prosperity. Yet wage and job programs only help a small percentage of
workers; for the unemployed, a BIG or something similar is still necessary.
Moreover, wage and job programs involve continuing government interference in
the market, which is why conservatives are so opposed. And as Peter Drucker
noted in his 1949 book, The New Society, when workers most need assistance is
during a recession, when money is less available and campaigns are more
difficult. Though Drucker opposed wage and job programs, he called for a
"predictable income plan" similar to a BIG. Conclusion: We should
celebrate the successes of living wage campaigns and work together for a BIG.
Then, with everyone empowered by a BIG, we should insist that all workers receive
living wages.
Stephen Bouquin, CNRS-Laboratoire G. Friedmann, and Catherine Levy, Universite de Picardie (Amiens) – France, “Social minima a part of
recommodification of labour? Critical assessment concerning the tendencies
towards basic income”
The research is based
on more than 250 interviews in four countries of the EU (France, UK, Germany,
Belgium) and analysed the way social minima are nowadays part of employment
policies and not only social policies (active social welfare state, activation
of passive benefits). By dissociating work and income, some of the measures
stimulate a cumulation of incomes from work and from social security system.
The benefit system is under transformation both on the level of the definition
of social rights as in their concrete use and effect on the labour market. The
state is therefore more and more in charge of populations whilst the active
citizens (as tax payers) are pushing towards a conditionality of benefits while
the employers can rest upon the existence of wage-subsidies without any
conditionality. We observed how benefit-users are enclosed in casual or non
statutory work, sometimes with compliance (workfare programs) but also by
themselves, trying to enhance their immediate financial situation. Whilst the
effects of these measures are not necessary unidimensional, at least they do
not oppose the recommodification and segmentation of the labour force which
translates itself in flexibility, bas working conditions, insecure life. The
proposal of a radical basic income should, in our view, take into account these
facts. In a context of (mass) unemployment, long term unemployment, scarcity of
jobs, basic income may have the same effect as during the Speenhamland period
in UK: reducing at the same time wages and poverty. The liberal and
neo-classical views on economy and work should therefore be critically revised.
4A: ACTIVISTS ROUND TABLE
Participants will not be presenting papers in this session.
4B: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BIG, PART II
Walter Van Trier, “Do Firms Need to be Third Places for Jobs
to be (Public) Good(s)? Remarks
on André Gorz’s recantation of the second cheque strategy and his adoption of
basic income”
Since the early 1980’s, André
Gorz has been a key figure in the European movement for the reduction and
redistribution of work time. In his most recent book, Misères du présent Richesse du possible, he recants this long held
position and explains why he now favours a reform strategy based on the
implementation of an unconditional grant or basic income. The first section of
this paper documents why the arguments for basic income in Misères du présent cannot be accepted as conclusive neither with
respect to countering the former arguments against BI nor with respect to
countering the former arguments in favour of a strategy of working time
reduction and redistribution. The second section presents the theoretical
framework of Gorz’ (former) arguments rested and explains the importance of
making a difference between ‘employment’ and ‘work’ (or ‘labour’) and of
conceiving of ‘jobs’ as ‘civilizing devices’. The third section looks at two
possible ways of understanding Gorz’ approach to jobs, comparing them to ‘third
places’ (Lash) or ‘sources for recognition’ (Walzer). The fourth section
documents why Gorz considers the ‘post-fordist regime’ as inimical to ‘good
jobs’ or ‘jobs as being (publicly) good’ and looks at the empirical base of
this claim. The fifth and final section does what final sections are supposed
to do, i.e. it concludes.
Philippe Van Parijs'and Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott's basic income proposals are intended to promote real freedom. Yet, they do so in different ways and the differences have led Ackerman and Alstott to argue that their stakeholder grant version of the basic income would be more real freedom promoting than Van Parijs' version. This paper argues that once one considers some relatively frequent "real world" decision-making patterns, there appear to be grounds for questioning Ackerman and Alstott's conclusion regarding the relative merits of stakeholder grants and Van Parijs' version of the basic income.
Thierry Laurent and Yannick L’Horty “Static vs. Dynamic Inactivity Trap on the Labor Market: Revisiting the ‘Making Work Pay’ Issue.”
Theoretical and applied theories on
gains for returning to employment and the economic policy recommendations they
inspire in setting up social benefits essentially derive from a static
approach. We suggest a dynamic
evaluation of these benefits taking into account the inter-temporal nature of
arbitration by the unemployed and the impact on the return to employment on
future employment perspectives. In this
dynamic framework, which includes workers’ mobility between jobs, we show that
the existence of a weak monetary gain upon return to employment is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient reason to explain the existence of a problem of
incentive or equity. The recommendations
of economic policy are thus modified.
In order to make work pay, it is more than a matter of reforming social
programs: priority must also be given
to ascending professional mobility through policies supporting growth and
policies that play an active part in the job market. Temporary assistance in returning to the job market can be just
as effective as permanent mechanisms inspired by income tax reduction devices,
as well as less costly for public finances.
4C: BIG AND THE ALTERNATIVES, PART II
Chair: Fred Block
Jerold Waltman, University
of Southern Mississippi, “The Basic Income Guarantee and the Living Wage: A
Comparative Anatomy”
This paper begins with the
thesis that the BIG and the living wage are designed to accomplish identical
objectives, the elimination of poverty, the reduction of inequality, and the
restoration of dignity to all citizens.
The question, then, is one of strategy.
We can unpack this matter into two specific questions: 1) Which is more
likely to garner the political support necessary for adoption? and 2) Does one
have policy advantages over the other?
I will argue, first, that the available survey data demonstrate that
there is much more political support for a living wage than a BIG. Second, I will maintain that the living wage
also has certain policy pluses on its side.
One is that it does a better job of assuring dignity to each citizen as
he or she relates to other citizens. By
tying the cash payment one receives directly to work done, a living wage
assures that no citizen can ever look another one in the eye and say “I am
supporting you.” Another is that a BIG
will be subject to the vagaries of governmental budgetary processes. On this terrain, as the recent income tax
cuts clearly demonstrate, the poor usually lose. To be sure, a living wage will also be subject to political
battles, but the issue can at least stand alone. Finally, a living wage is more sensitive to the value of work as
a good in itself. There is a growing
literature that points to the conclusion that in fact there are individual and
social gains to be had when work is encouraged.
In short, if we want to assure
a certain income floor for all citizens, the living wage would be preferable to
the BIG.
Barbara R.
Bergmann, American University and University of Maryland, “A Swedish-Style
Welfare State Or Basic Income: Which Should Have Priority?”
It is argued that the
establishment and funding of a Swedish-style welfare state, with state
provision of a long list of "merit goods"plus targeted cash payments
to those in special circumstances, has a higher priority than large cash
payments to all citizens, as called for in the Stakeholding and Basic Income
proposals. An analysis of the Swedish budget shows that advanced countries
cannot do both at once, given current levels of per capita income. Other
problems with a near-term rapid introduction of large universal cash payments
include the disincentive to work for pay, which would reduce per capita income
and make the problem of financing such payments through taxation even more
acute, the probable retrograde effects on gender equality, and a reduction in
the power of parents vis-a-vis their teenage children. After the achievement of
a well-established welfare state, rises over time in productivity may gradually
open up room in the national budget for universal cash payments. Such payments,
if the country then wishes to make them, could be phased in slowly as the room
appears.
Karl Widerquist, the Educational Priorities Panel, “Wage
Subsidies and/or Income Guarantees.”
Edmund Phelps, in his book Rewarding
Work, makes a case for wage subsidies as an alternative to the American
welfare system arguing that work-based redistribution will reduce poverty and
build stronger communities. This paper compares this wage subsidy plan, not to
the existing welfare system, but to another reform—the basic income guarantee.
This paper argues that each of the reforms have benefits to offer, and either
may be preferred depending on the goals of the reforms.